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WORLD AND WORD IN THEOPHANY 
Kenneth L. Schmitz 
In my distress I called upon the Lord; to my God I cried for help. 
From His temple He heard my voice, my cry came to His ears. 
Then the earth quivered and quaked, the foundations of the mountains 
trembled ... 
From His nostrils a smoke ascended, and from His mouth a fire that 
consumed ... 
He bent the heavens and came down, a dark cloud under His feet. .. 
He came swiftly upon the wings of the wind. 
He made darkness His covering around Him, His canopy thick clouds 
dark with water. 
Before Him a flash enkindled hail and fiery embers. 
The Lord thundered in the heavens, and the Most High made His voice 
heard. 
And He sent out His arrows, and scattered them, 
He flashed forth lightnings, and routed them. 
The bed of the seas was revealed, the foundations of the world were 
laid bare, 
At Thy rebuke, 0 Lord, at the blast of Your nostrils' breath. 
He reached from on high, He took me, He drew me from deep waters. 
He delivered me from my powerful enemy, from a foe too strong for me. 
Psalm 18, vv. 6-171 
To many of us today the theophanies of the Psalter may seem comfortably re-
mote, familiar but irrelevant. We may even read or hear them with a twinge of em-
barrassment.Our God has better manners nowadays; he's kept up with the general 
refinement in taste and comportment. And so, sadly or gladly, we may decide that 
theophanies are not for us, not of our time, this time which has other matters with 
which to busy itself. 
Or so I might have thought, had I not been present some years ago at a gathering 
of Christians to whom a Rabbi spoke. He told us how, during the 1930's, he had 
been part of the recurrent experience of Jewish Enlightenment, of how he had ac-
cepted the progressive secularization of life, by which a relatively closed rational 
system of scientific laws and natural processes had drawn a tight impenetrable 
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seemed able to penetrate it, and very little of human life could break free of it, 
could even reach beyond it. But after the foundation of the secular state of Israel-
and here he paused, quite conscious of the dramatic effect-there came yet another 
threat to the very existence of the Jewish people. All about seemed at risk, dark 
with danger and doom. But then, unexpectedly, it came: the six days of deliver-
ance dawned, with swift sword strokes that cut away the threat and freed the 
people. The Rabbi speaks: "At that moment the tight shell of the secular world 
cracked and fell away, and for a moment in that gap we saw Him, the Holy One of 
Israel, our deliverer and our joy." 
His story was greeted with murmur; some in the audience were offended. "How 
dare he say such a thing, and in the middle of the twentieth century, too." And 
others were ruminating: "How can he put such an interpretation upon events, after 
the tireless efforts to provide a rational exegesis, to give naturalization papers to 
alien events." And surely, it is more credible to offer to "modem man" a study of 
wind and tide in the Sea of Reeds than a parting of the waves? Or to replace the 
miracles in Egypt with the pathology of recurrent plagues? Or again, manna from 
heaven with dewy desert phenomena? Instead, the Rabbi's claim brought back the 
whole embarrassing atmosphere of Biblical religion, the claim to a special experi-
ence of the divine. 
Later, over coffee, I asked the Rabbi: "By what right did you say such a shock-
ing thing?" His reply-but then, how can one reply to such a question?-puzzled 
me. For he answered by simply giving his credentials: "I am," he said, "one of only 
three Rabbis whose determinations are acceptable to all the major groups in North 
American Judaism." Now, what sort of a reply is that? It was almost as impenetr-
able to me as the replies of Zen practitioners. It seems to leave the question wide 
open, if not entirely untouched. It is obviously an argument from authority, and so, 
from another. But who or what is that other? Is it the people to whom he minis-
tered? But that might be more Durkheimean than the Rabbis would have wished. 
Was it sanctioned by the Holy One Himself? But even Moses had trouble with such 
a warrant. 
At that time, of course, both he and I had as yet been spared the need of reading 
the more recent popular psychology to find out that it was one side of the brain talk-
ing to the other. Indeed, even then, I pride myself, I did not expect philosophy or 
sociology or psychology or politics or even meteorology to definitively answer the 
question, if it were to be answered at all. Nevertheless, I also recognized that re-
ligious language and theological discourse had themselves to be monitored by a ra-
tional reflection and to be required to meet intelligible standards. If religion and 
philosophy could each keep their integrity, both might benefit by such reciprocity 
in the interests of a richer intelligibility, as they have often enough in the past. It 
was the old tension between reason and faith. With that realization I found myself 
in peto a philosopher of religion. But now, what can a philosopher say that might 
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shed additional light upon the nature of such a claim to theophany? 
What is, perhaps, most disturbing in the Rabbi's claim is not that it has been 
made in the twentieth century, but rather, its immediacy. It is, so to speak, a fresh 
claim. Of course, it is not without associations. After all, it was a Rabbi who 
spoke; that is, he spoke out of a religious community, conscious of a specific re-
ligious tradition and its sub-traditions, with a fully developed language at its call. 
Indeed, he spoke by means of and through the whole texture and context, the space 
and time, of Jewish memory and experience. And so, we are not dealing with bare 
immediacy, a firstness that arises without association. Indeed, only a misplaced 
romanticism will insist that we can ever encounter bare immediacy; for wherever 
we are, there too is our complex structure: if it is an idea, it is mediated by our sen-
sibility; if it is a sensation, by our organs; if an alteration in our organs, then by a 
medium which comes to us in our situation as we interact with other beings in the 
world. Now, if in ordinary matters we cannot claim bare immediacy, so much the 
less is it likely in sacred things. Indeed, Biblical religion warns against the preten-
sion of seeing God face to face: "Do not reveal the fulness ofthy face to us, 0 Lord, 
lest we perish. Yet reveal thyself in some measure, lest we die from want." We 
ought to resist the temptation, then, of imagining some umeflective mythical 
period in which a people is fused in immediate union with the sacred and with one 
another. The presence of the sacred among a people is always a manifestation in 
determinate form through a finite medium. The hierophany- in Biblical religion, 
the theophany-is realized in a storm, through a figure, on a mountain height, dur-
ing an event, in the giving of new life, in the quiet movements of the heart, or in 
some other limited and definite way. 
If the Rabbi has spoken truly, it is a fresh theophany, but not a bare immediacy. 
For it is also one of many in a long series, a theophany of that same theos around 
whom communities of Biblical faith have centered throughout the generations, a 
theophany addressed to a community in historical continuity with Biblical Israel. 
Moreover, the historical background and context is not a mere frame surrounding 
the event after the manner by which we sometimes border a painting. It is not 
something external to the event. Rather, the historical context is ingredient in the 
event itself. It is the God of Israel who is manifested, that God whose theophanies 
have been set down in the Psalms and other Scriptures. And the speaker is a Rabbi, 
reared in a faith-community which is continuous with Biblical Israel. So that the 
mediation that dresses the element of immediacy is not simply extrinsic: the medi-
ation is itself constitutive of the experienced event in its totality. That is, the event 
itself is mediated immediacy. I propose, then, to explore the sense of that mediated 
immediacy by retreating to a series of past theophanies, explicitly described and 
alluded to in the context of Biblical religion. I will have in mind chiefly three texts 
from the Psalms: 18, vv. 6-17; 29, vv. 3-9; and 114, vv. 3-8. The analysis will not 
pretend to draw secure conclusions about the nature oftheophany in general, and 
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much less about hierophany, even though analogies may suggest themselves. The 
focus wiII be upon Biblical religion, since this is appropriate to the present pur-
pose, and quite difficult enough. 
I 
The career of a Biblical text is remarkably like a series of rites de passage. With-
out undue simplification for our purpose, we might distinguish five such stages in 
which a text passes from one state to another. There is, first of all, the articulation 
of the experience of some primary event; for example, the manifestation of God in 
a storm orin a battle. The account may draw upon a series of similar past events; so 
that in the articulation, the initial and primary event acquires a certain narrative re-
sonance with other events, and an "expressive thickness" is built up in the text by 
allusions to earlier narratives. This accumulation of sense is for the most part lost 
to our sight, except insofar as historical exegesis can reconstruct it. At least some 
of this condensation wiIl have occurred in the form of prior oral traditions, passing 
from one generation and situation to another. We arrive at a second stage in the 
career of a Biblical text, then, when the text receives a certain fixity of form by 
passing from its oral traditions to written ones: it becomes scripture. Here, too, 
however, it may undergo development, diverging into several written traditions 
and taking final shape under one or more editorial hands. At some point, and in a 
long drawn out third stage, the text receives canonical status: it becomes Sacred 
Scripture, and is recognized as a sanctioned, authoritative text, normative for wor-
ship and teaching, for morality and spiritUality. It is as though it has now entered 
upon its official life, its seniority. Subsequently, in a fourth stage of its career, it is 
called upon to respond to different situations--changes of generation, differences 
of social institution, custom and linguistic style-even while it retains its essential, 
normative character. Interpreted and re-interpreted, applied in a variety of ways, it 
acquires a host of camp-followers in the form of commentaries. It is thereby 
brought into relation with other texts, both canonical and extra-canonical, secular 
as well as sacred; yet it keeps its sanctioned, normative character for religious pur-
poses. It may take up its dwelling in other cultural households, be diffused by 
translation into other linguistic matrices, and be adapted to the alien heritages im-
plicit in other tongues. 
In quite recent times, and in what constitutes a distinctive fifth stage, the 
methods and techniques of critical historiography and literary hermeneutics have 
been used to interpret the text, its setting and its antecedents. Biblical texts have 
been subjected to a more or less scientific research, which has yielded an abundant 
harvest of information and a more complex understanding of the texts. It is un-
doubtedly true that the intensive research into Biblical texts is due in part at least to 
the interest which individual researchers have in them because they are religious 
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texts. Still, for the most part and in principle, these investigators approach Biblical 
texts as special objects of ordinary historical research and seek to bring an under-
standing of their significance to the level of rigorous scientific discourse. 
It is the chief argument of this paper, however, that, in addition to such modem 
scholarship, we need to arrive at an explicit understanding of these texts in the 
form of a discourse that continues to recognize them precisely as religious docu-
ments, a mode of discourse that can develop their specifically religious character 
in a thematic way. In order to attempt this we first need a clearer conception of 
what I have just now called "discourse". 
I have found it helpful in other contexts to distinguish between the manifold or-
dinary uses of language and its use in the form of discourse. 2 Religious usage in a 
natural language puts that language at the service of a believing community in 
order to express a whole range of religious possibilities for life, action and thought: 
for worship in prayer and cult, for instruction through story and commandment, 
for the experience, commemoration and anticipation of communal and individual 
association with the sacred. Discourse, on the other hand, is a modification of lan-
guage that seeks to articulate an understanding of a subject-matter in a methodical, 
conceptual and systematic fashion. Unlike religious usage with its manifold in-
terests, practical as well as theoretical, discourse is language placed at the service 
of thought insofar as thought is interested in determining the truth of some thing or 
state of affairs within the demands of its conceptual, methodical and systematic 
aims. 
Discourse is applied in various ways to the understanding of religious subject-
matters. Thus, for example, systematic theology is a mode of discourse, but it ar-
ticulates its understanding of a specific religion on the basis of and within a com-
munity of faith. But discourse about religion can also be attempted in the name of 
a philosophy of religion, i.e., on the basis of a conception of reason and within its 
canons. And so, whereas theology takes the sacred texts as principles or sources 
from which it elaborates its systematic understanding, a philosophy ·of religion 
(conceived in the above manner) will take these same texts in their religious 
character as the subject-matter to be investigated on the basis of reason and its ca-
nons and principles, i.e., within an understanding of philosophical rationality. 
Such a philosophy of religion is not quite the same as the prevalent philosophical 
theology that usually goes by the name "Philosophy of Religion" , but which would 
be more properly called "Philosophy of God." To be sure, both are legitimate 
philosophical enquiries. But the former will address the religious character of its 
subject-matter more directly and explicitly in order to try to gain a philosophical 
understanding of religion, whereas the latter is in fact an epistemological (and 
sometimes a metaphysical) enquiry that seeks to test the idea and reality of God 
with probing questions about the probability of God's existence, the predication of 
divine attributes and the manifest fact of evil. 
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II 
Over the years, in reading through even a part of the vast scholarly and religious 
literature upon the Psalms, I have found it helpful to distinguish three broad sets of 
comments; the discursive, the moral and the aesthetic. 3 
The categories of discourse (in the sense in which I have just outlined the term) 
may vary in generality, and may be more or less appropriately adapted to the study 
of religion. Thus, very general explanatory categories, drawn more or less unal-
tered from modes of discourse such as sociology, psychology and political theory , 
can indeed throw a pale and distant light upon the significance of a religious text. 
But, although their light is generally informative, it is still a refracted light, a light 
that only indirectly, if at all, throws the religious bearing of the text into relief. 
When these modes of discourse are taken in themselves as complete accounts of 
religion, they are simply reductive. On the other hand, as in the fifth stage, when 
their categories are adapted to use in the archaeology ofthe Bible and in its cultural 
and social history, they are able to shed a more focussed light upon the text. They 
provide a host of details, many of them cross-cultural and cross-religious. They set 
forth both the background and the development of a particular text, and they show 
forth its institutional setting, along with the implicit customs and values that may 
underly it: in a word, they recover the Sitz im Leben of the text. This is true of the 
older literary and historical studies, as well as of the more recent form-critical 
method. Exclusive reliance upon these approaches, however, runs the continual 
risk of dissolving the religious significance of the text into the rational texture of 
the methodology of the discourse itself. It seems to me, therefore, that it is one of 
the tasks of a philosophy of religion to articulate a context in which the results of 
these historiographical studies may be brought to bear upon the properly religious 
character of the text. It is to this task that I will shortly return, with whatever mod-
est results the reader must decide. 
The second broad type of comment draws its categories from morality. Cer-
tainly, morality is no mere by-product in Biblical religion, but is rather an indis-
pensable partial ascesis. Nevertheless, both religious life and the history of reli-
gions has helped to make clear that moral categories in themselves do not exhaust 
or even determine the specifically religious significance of theophanies such as 
those recounted in the Psalms. The ampler categories of the history of religions 
and of the older descriptive phenomenology preserve the specifically religious 
character of their phenomena better, and they can serve as a sort of fore-court to the 
temple into which the understanding seeks to pass; but they do this just insofar as 
they resist the reduction of the religious elements in their descriptions to the moral. 
The third broad type of comment expresses itself in poetic and aesthetic terms, 
and seems to gain widest approval today. This may be illustrated by a random 
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selection of comments made upon a passage from Psalm 114 (vv. 3-4): 
The sea looked and fled, Jordan turned back. 
The mountains skipped like rams, the hills like lambs. (RSV) 
The great Cardinal Bellarmine wrote in his Commentary' that "wonderful things" 
had happened, and that the Psalmist relates them 
in a most beautiful and figurative manner, addressing nature as if it had 
sense [emphasis added]. 
Another writer' "explains" the aberrant behaviour of fleeing sea and leaping moun-
tains as a literary device, that of personification. The Oxford English Dictionary 
notes an early sense ofthis term: "fayning a person." And it gives this account: 
A rhetorical figure by which an imaginary or absent person is rep-
resented as speaking or acting; the introduction of a pretended speaker .... 
'A rhetorical figure by which an inanimate or abstract thing is repesented 
as a person, or with personal characteristics. 
The connotation is redolent with fiction (as if), dubiety (pretense), and absence. 
No doubt, when the Lord God shows himself he does not disclose his full presence, 
face to face; but it is at least a question whether his muted presence in a theophany 
is best interpreted by such literary devices as personification, in which the notion 
of a certain impropriety and artificiality is present. Such a classification of the 
sense of the text may domesticate it too quickly, assimilating it to a ready-made 
static catalogue of rhetorical figures drawn up from non-religious materials. 6 No 
one is more unimaginative than an interpreter who speaks so neatly and readily of 
the imagination. We learn from still others that the passage is "poetic," "highly 
poetic," "a poetic description," cast "in poetic fancy."7 After excusing the Psalmist 
for "poetic license," another writer suggests that 
the quaking of the mountain is poetically exaggerated into a motion that 
might be likened to the frisking of lambs 
Another9 finds that 
the poetic figure of the 'sympathy of nature' runs through the Psalm. 
The phrase "sympathy of nature" may provide more than is needed to elucidate the 
text, since the aroma of magic clings to the phrase; nor does the writer explain how 
nature is able to possess such fellow-feeling with man. The Liber Psalmorum lO 
finds the manner of expression to be "so to speak, in the dramatic mode, as it were" 
(modo quasi 'dramatico'). The inverted commas around the word "dramatic" and 
the use of the deprecatory "quasi" show a certain hesitation and reserve. Indeed 
there may be a double-edged wisdom in such a reserve. It may signify a hesitation 
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lest the "vulgar" (i.e., the uneducated) identify the natural elements too directly 
with the divine presence in the theophany, and lest the educated condemn the text 
as literal and fatuous. But, however prudent this double-edged wisdom might be, 
it does not carry us into the religious significance ofthe text, and if it is taken as de-
cisive in determining the sense of the text, then it diminishes that significance. It 
is, to adapt Bishop Berkeley'S phrase, as though a pinch of dust is thrown into our 
eyes so that we cannot see. No doubt, too, there is wisdom in talking to and about 
the sacred with reserve and hesitation, but the question remains: What manner of 
reservation and hesitation? 
A brief consideration of the term "hyperbole" may point up the issue. Some 
writers 11 remark upon the "hyperbolic" character of this passage. Now, hyperbola 
in geometry is the excess of the length of the curved line over the straight line that 
joins any two of its points in two dimensional or plane space. The word fits a con-
text in which two-dimensionality is normative, whereas a line that is curvilinear in 
two-dimensional space is actually the shortest and most direct in the fuller three-di-
mensional or solid space. By analogy, then, God and His "movements" will only 
be made obscurer still if we use the unaltered conceptions of ordinary understand-
ing (corresponding in the analogy to plane space) as the definitive measure of 
theophany (corresponding to solid space). And so, it makes a difference whether 
we are trying to construe a third dimension from two or whether we are situating 
our understanding of two dimensions within the context of solid (i.e. three-dimen-
sional) space. 
If we are to render the distinctively religious character of a Biblical theophany 
into discourse, however inadequately, we need more than these categories-his-
toriographic, moral or aesthetic ,-whose explanatory power has been drawn from 
and remains proportioned to forms of discourse that have not been designed to 
cope with the extraordinary character of religious language and the life that it ex-
presses. What is needed is conversion. 
It is most important at this point that I not be misunderstood. I do not here call for 
a conversion in the religious sense, i.e., for acceptance in faith of the truth of the 
Lord as He has revealed Himself. Nonetheless, I do not mean something less than 
a religious conversion, a kind of mild religiosity. I mean, rather, a shift of mind 
that operates at a different level and for a different purpose from that of religious 
faith. I mean a change of direction in interpretation. For the call here is not to a con-
version in faith but to a shift in the standpoint and flow of the interpretation. What 
is required is a methodological conversion. Such a conversion is open to all inter-
preters, whether they are believers or not. It is required, moreover, for the sake of 
the adequacy of the interpretation, and as a first step towards understanding the 
text in its religious significance. And so, it is not a question of how near one must 
come to a religious conversion, any more than Descartes had to suffer a real doubt 
rather than a methodical one. His doubt was taken seriously for the sake of advan-
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tages he hoped it would bring to his enquiry. So, too, here the conversion is neither 
more nor less religous, because it is not a religious conversion at all. The enquirer 
need not be religious. 12 Almost certainly, he or she must have a certain interest, 
fascination or even sympathy for the subject-matter under investigation, but that is 
a quite general requirement for any investigation. Such sympathy is not approval. 
Rather, it is in this instance an ability to imaginatively recreate the experience of 
what it means to be religious in a specific way. And that requires, in tum, a high 
degree of interest and some sense of the importance of the enquiry. This attention 
to the subject-matter is such a general requirement that it may not be noticed in 
other fields of enquiry, but religion is such an extra-ordinary affair that the en-
quirer must be quite clear about the nature and necessity for a methodological con-
version, and must keep that requirement as distinct from his religious convictions 
as a doctor keeps his enquiry into health and disease from his own physical condi-
tion. 
We must distinguish, then, between the position, on the one hand, and the 
grounds for and manner of taking it, on the other. If the position is taken in faith, 
and out of genuine religious conviction, we have a religious conversion. If, on the 
other hand, the position is taken out of a theoretical interest in understanding in 
some measure at least what is being claimed, then we have a methodological con-
version, taken in the interests of a discursive understanding. In both cases, how-
ever, once that shift is taken, there can be no talk of "hyperbole"; for from the 
centre of a Biblical theophany itself no language can be excessive enough. What, 
after all, has the Lord to do with earthquake and thunderstorm? These phenomena 
of nature pale beside His glory. No language can be original enough to be exces-
sive, once it is interpreted from out of the eye of the storm itself. In the spirit of 
faith, someone has written that "the Psalms are realistic with God's own 
realism."l3 And, indeed, religious writers on spirituality take up the transposition 
from the human to the divine into the context of actual faith. 14 But, in a quite differ-
ent manner and from a quite different concern, it is just such a vantage-point that 
the text demands of us if we are to recover its religious character, even though we 
recover it for discourse rather than for faith. It goes without saying that such a dis-
cursive recovery can be of use to a faith which takes it up, "faith seeking under-
standing"; but its own integrity and its own responsibility as discourse is not 
thereby impugned. Nowhere is the rigour of a phenomenological suspension 
(epoche) more appropriate. 
Let us adopt that vantage-point now for the sake of our enquiry into what the text 
might mean in its properly religious significance. From the vantage-point of the 
eye of the storm the Psalmist cries out to nature: 
Tremble, 0 earth, at the presence of the Lord. [RSV] 
Quake, earth, at the coming of your Master. [JB] 
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And, on the combined grounds of its religious character and the interests of dis-
course, the theophany calls upon the very methodology of discourse itself to trem-
ble and to quake. 
To sum up, then, the philosopher of religion is not expected to pronounce either 
for or against the truth of the religious claim that is explicit or implicit in the 
theophany. Nevertheless, in accordance with quite general requirements of en-
quiry, he is bound to let the religious claim be made in its own appropriate way; 
just as, for example, the philosopher of art is bound to let an artistic tradition devel-
op in accordance with its own possibilities. What makes the analogy suspect be-
tween the relation of art and philosophy, on the one hand, and of religion and 
philosophy, on the other, is that most if not all major religions do make belief 
claims of some sort. Certainly, Biblical religions do; whereas many artistic tradi-
tions do not. Nevertheless, if we broaden the conception of expression to include 
more than cognitive and belief claims, much of art does lay claim to a kind of sig-
nificance. And so, I would argue that the analogy does hold in a weak sense, and 
that that sense is enough to purchase a certain directive for our purposes: viz., that, 
just as the philosopher of art does not decide upon the significance of art (critical 
aficionados-artists, critics and public-do that), so too, the philosopher of reli-
gion does not decide upon the ultimate truth of the claims made by a religion. This 
does not mean that art, religion and philosophy are hermetically sealed from one 
another, but rather that in their vital interchange with one another, each retains its 
own integrity and assimilates aspects of the others in accordance with its own na-
ture. 
The conversion to which the philosopher of religion is called, then, is to change 
his situation because of considerations of method, and to hold open his basic 
categories of reality, meaning, place, time, causality and the like, in order to see 
whether they can bear the new weight put upon them. If we ask: How open? We 
can only reply that that is just what is yet to be determined. And if it is asked: What 
weight? We must reply: Only so much as can be rationally measured. There is no 
doubt that these conceptions have already undergone development in philosophy, 
and not through philosophical reflection alone, but also through the impact of other 
dimensions of thought and life. It is too easy for us to forget, for example, the rad-
ical development in the concepts of matter, form, causality and law that occurred 
in the sixteenth century scientific revolution, and that released new conceptual and 
methodological possibilities for philosophy itself. Or the developments in the con-
cepts of person, freedom and divinity that were involved in the theological debates 
of the fourth century, and that later entered the philosophical stream. Now, a simi-
lar revolution has been going on since the middle of the last century in the histori-
cal-cultural sciences, and one of its results is a new, more reflective understanding 
of religion. Indeed, the initial motivating force of that revolution has been the his-
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toriographical investigation of Biblical religion. This newly won understanding is 
available to the philosopher of religion, and calls upon him to approach his subject-
matter with a new openness. If the rational categories of his philosophy can bear 
the new weight put upon them, they may not remain entirely unaltered, just as 
philosophical categories did not survive the sixteenth century revolution unal-
tered, or that of the fourth. But their development will contribute to ontology and 
epistemology, and also to a better philosophical understanding of theophany itself. 
All of this must be done without deciding the issue of the truth or falsity of religi-
ous claims in general and theophany in particular. What such a philosopher of reli-
gion will have decided----;inasmuch as anything is decided in philosophy-is the 
issue of the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of those claims from the point of 
view of the canons of rationality. Moreover, he will have practised a methodolog-
ical conversion which will permit him to relate the theophany to more general 
categories of being and meaning. The enterprise is not without its perils, but no 
worthy task is free of them. Nor is this a call to an indiscriminate openness, which 
would be nothing short of an abandonment of the carefully elaborated discipline of 
reason. Rather, it simply sets forth the possibility of a development of our under-
standing of philosophy and of religion, a development that is continuous with the 
known canons of rational discourse. 
III 
In carrying out the present methodological conversion, we must look more 
closely at the texture of the accounts of theophany in the Psalms. In remarking pre-
viously upon the mediated immediacy that is characteristic of theophany, I drew 
attention to a certain "expressive thickness" that is built into the accounts of 
theophany in the Psalms. Echoes from earlier theophanies resonate within them. 
Some interpreters of Psalm 29 consider it to be the account of an actual experience 
of a storm as it swept across the land. But they also recognize that the theophany is 
dressed in part in the language of earlier theophanies and previous accounts. Con-
trary to the crude strictures of earlier rationalist historians, such repetition does not 
discredit the authenticity of the experience, since prior experiences and previous 
descriptions of theophanies might well be drawn upon without imputing inauthen-
ticity to the present account. Indeed, the repetition may be a key to a deeper signifi-
cance. 15 Thus, the restatement in 2 Samuel 22 of the same theophany set forth in 
Psalm 18 reinforces the original sense of the theophany by providing it with an ex-
ternal correlate in a new context. 
The texture of a Psalm is thickened internally, moreover, when a theophany is 
associated with one or more other theophanies within the text of a single Psalm. 
This may happen in two basic ways. First, by way of recollection. An intrinsic and 
constitutive recollection of an earlier theophany often occurs within the very Psalm 
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that sets forth a later theophany. Thus, in Psalm 114 the earlier saving deeds of 
God are remembered in the opening lines: 
When Israel went forth from Egypt, the house of Jacob from 
a people of strange language, 
Judah became his sanctuary, Israel his dominion. 
The sea looked and fled, Jordan turned back. 
The mountains skipped like rams, the hills like lambs. [RSV] 
Here the Psalmist has brought the great theophany of the Exodus, the parting of 
the Red Sea, together with the theophany of the crossing of the Jordan. There is 
within the Psalm, then, a double recollection: The Psalmist himself recalls the 
crossing of the Jordan, and within that recall finds echoes of the earlier Exodus. 
Examples of similar recollection can be easily multiplied. Such recollection is the 
transmutation of immediacy ,- either one's own or another' s-into that "emotion 
recollected in tranquillity" of which the poet speaks. The narrative account of the 
theophany takes form as a recollection. So that, in singing about theophany, the 
poet does not seize upon the moment of bare immediacy: that is an abstraction po-
sited by thought, and is not accessible as a separate experience, even for the Psal-
mist who may have experienced the theophany directly. Immediacy is there, but 
not separately and in itself. It is always clothed with the context in which it ap-
pears, the medium through which it is manifest and the subject that undergoes it. 
We may separate these constituents of experience in thought as I have just done, 
but they do not thereby become experiences in their own right. Experience is al-
ways a complex affair, and one which consists oftemporal complexity as well, i.e. 
in which past and future playa role as well as the present. 16 
Recollection of a past theophany is a paramount way in which religious narrative 
ensconces the event that inspires it. It is characteristic of religious revelation that it 
is received as something which has already been disclosed. To gain access to such 
a truth, then, requires a recollection. It is not incidental, therefore, that 
philosophers who arise within a religious milieu often formulate their understand-
ing of truth in terms of the recollection of a kind of pastness. Mention need only be 
made of Plato's anamnesis or reminiscence, Augustine's memoria, Hegel's Erin-
nerung or interior recall, Heidegger's Wiederholen or retrieval, and Marcel's re-
connaissance or recognition. 17 
In addition to the deliberate recall of other theophanies, however, the Psalter 
holds obscurer depths. Many Biblical manuscripts are actual palimpsests. The Bi-
blical text is written over a surface beneath which earlier writings have been rub-
bed away to make place for the text of the Bible; not, however, without leaving 
faint traces of the earlier writings, obscure but sometimes still legible to the trained 
eye of the paleographer, so that one may speak of the physical presence of graphic 
layers in the manuscripts. In addition to this physical palimpsest, however, there is 
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what I might call a second-order palimpsest, which is discoverable-not by the 
paleographer-but by the exegete ofthe text. In the Psalms this palimpsest is a rich 
texture of images and conceptions, which are more or less obscure to us and which 
are either explicitly alluded to by the Psalmist or carried more or less unwittingly 
into the Psalm from the traditional materials that then lay to hand. In most cases, 
the process of assimilation has itself been rubbed away by forgetfulness and si-
lence, and by the slow or sudden change of situation. Over the past hundred and 
fifty years, Biblical scholarship has recovered some of this second-order 
palimpsest and shown in detail how it is inseparable from the religious significance 
of the text (even though we must not forget that earlier generations did well enough 
with the Scriptures in their own time and in their own way, i.e., largely without the 
knowledge of that second-order palimpsest). 
In what I have already called the fifth stage in the career of a Biblical text, viz., 
that of critical historiography, possibilities of a further understanding of the religi-
ous significance of the Psalms are offered by the methods and techniques of dis-
course insofar as they have been brought to bear upon the recovery of the second-
order palimpsest upon which a Psalm itself may rest. The Psalm itself does not 
issue from that second-order palimpsest or underlay as from its source or ground 
(Grund), but rests upon it rather as upon its foundation (Grundlage). Thus, in ad-
dition to the conscious recollection of the great theophanies at Sinai and the Red 
Sea, the Psalm may contain imagery and language used previously to extol the 
Canaanite storm-god Baal (Ps. 29). Or it may claim for the Biblical Lord a series of 
titles drawn from a Ugaritic poem to the Lord-god Iskur (Ps. 18). Or again (Ps. 
114), the undercurrent of a mythical struggle may flow beneath the surface of the 
Biblical text itself, the representation of creation as a victory of a creator-god over 
rebellious primeval waters. 
The palimpsest of imagery is undeniable; but equally undeniable is the profound 
transformation which these non-Biblical materials usually undergo as they find 
their way into the texture, into the narrative thickness, of a Biblical Psalm. For in-
stance, the sea does not retreat defiantly (as it is depicted in the non-Biblical docu-
ments); rather, it acknowledges its Lord, and obeys without a struggle: 
The sea looked and fled, Jordan turned back. 
The mountains skipped like rams, the hills like lambs. (RSV) 
Hans Joachim Kraus sees in this transformation, not only the overcoming of a par-
ticular myth, but the victory of Jahweh over myth itself. He remarks that, in show-
ing forth God's Lordship as the fundamental event of the theophany, the 
theophany bursts open and dissolves the whole mythical complex of the alleged 
time of chaos. 18 What we have here, then, is the sublimation of a "whole mythical 
complex" into the narrative depth of the text, a new magnitude that achieves unity 
under the transforming power of a distinctive disclosure about the Lordship of 
God. 
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IV 
The manifestation of God's Lordship is celebrated in the nature-theophanies as 
a "great and wonderful thing." Psalm 29 reads in part: 
The voice of the Lord is upon the waters, 
the God of glory thunders ... 
The voice of the Lord is [full of power] ... 
The voice of the Lord [shatters] the cedars, 
breaks the cedars of Lebanon. 
He makes [Mt.] Lebanon to skip like a calf, 
and [Mt.] Sirion like a young wild ox. 
The voice of the Lord flashes forth flames of ftre. 
The voice of the Lord shakes the wilderness ... 
The voice of the Lord makes the oaks to whirl [or: 
the hinds to calve], and strips the forests bare; 
And in His temple all cry, "Glory." [RSV, slightly amended] 
It may prove helpful to carry a bit further the preceding analysis of the texture of 
a theophanic Psalm, whose primary theme-the Lordship of God-is reinforced 
by recollection and palimpsest, and to do so by-taking up a speciftc sub-theme for 
analysis. What is the appropriate measure of the "greatness" that is manifest in 
such a theophany and celebrated in such a Psalm? Especially with regard to the role 
that nature is called upon to play in the theophany? What can philosophical dis-
course say about the magnitude of a nature-theophany as it is expressed in such a 
Psalm? 
In setting out to detennine the magnitude appropriate to a Biblical nature-
theophany, we have only to put the question in order to realize the radical character 
of the conversion of discourse that is needed if we are to give a discursive account 
of the religious signiftcance of such a nature-theophany. For the category of mag-
nitude must be kept open, since it will be found to include such diverse "quantities" 
as physical mass, textual scope and divine power, so that the ordinary concept of 
magnitude will not prove adequate to determine the "greatness" of the "great and 
wonderful" things that the text claims to have been done by God. 
To begin with, in many Biblical nature-theophanies there are elements of the 
miraculous, of that which is unusual, even contrary to the expected movements of 
nature: the waters part, the river turns back. Over the past two centuries or more, 
discourse has often sought to find natural explanations for many Biblical 
phenomena: an uncommon but not unique shift in wind direction in the region of 
the Red Sea is brought forward to account for the rare and sudden withdrawal of the 
waters; or again, landslides are said to have temporarily dammed the Jordan from 
time to time, making a crossing possible. In this method of interpretation, miracul-
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ous events are assimilated to already well-defined categories of rational explana-
tion, and the events thereby shed their miraculous character; or rather, the miracle 
is now found to reside in the marvellous timing of the natural event; and, if that 
fails, then, in the collective belief and trust among the people that something 
"God-like" has happened. These attempts are not without their value: negatively 
and critically, they work against undue credulity; and positively, they recover in-
formation about the natural and historical elements of the situation that aids our un-
derstanding. Still, they do not come to grips with the religious significance of the 
theophany in terms of discourse, just because they do not proceed on the basis of a 
methodological conversion. 
To say a little about that religious significance, then, I should like to look else-
where than at these naturalizing explanations, or rather, to look differently at the 
theophany and the text which expresses it. For the religious significance of the na-
ture-theophanies in the Psalms does not consist in a sudden and rare increase of 
natural forces, as though the earthquake, when it is a theophany, is greater than 
other earthquakes. It is not the violence of the natural commotion that makes up its 
religious significance. Its religious character is not to be sought for in the natural 
magnitude ofthe effect, as though God's storms are bigger than others, more ter-
rible than nature's. That would suggest that the wind, rain and lightning of a 
theophany must be of superhurricane force, and that we could tell a theophany by 
the points added to the Richter scale. It is this that is unsatisfactory about talking of 
the Psalmist's "poetic exaggeration," as though he adds points to an imaginary 
Richter scale. We should forget in that case, then, what Elijah learned: thatl ah weh 
is manifest even in the gentle breeze. 19 But, if we ought not to expect a quantitative 
hint from nature, no more should we look for a qualitative one, for a distinctive 
configuration of events peculiar to God, as though he were to leave a species-spe-
cific tell-tale trail to show that he has passed by, in the way in which some animals 
leave traces along their path, or as an artist signs a piece of work that he thinks 
might be wrongly attributed to another. 
The magnitude appropriate to a theophany must be sought for in a different way 
and in different terms. The religious believer seizes upon it in faith, by a kind of ap-
perception; and this faith is the primary apprehension of the theophany and its 
"greatness." By means of discourse, however, we might also try to understand its 
magnitude by measuring it in terms-not of a natural space and time-but of a dis-
tinctive depth and an appropriate duration. To suggest how that might be done, I 
propose to lay hands upon Kant, for it is Kant who gave us the first modem explo-
ration of the constitution of the sensible appearance of nature as phenomenon. 
Perhaps they are violent hands, for they reach beyond the bounds he set for reli-
gion. Still, undaunted, they tum towards his "Analytic of Principles" (Critique of 
Pure Reason, A 130/B 169ff.) to find there a source of hints that may point the way 
into this obscure domain. 
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First of all, the texture of the theophanic Psalms shows them to be extensive 
magnitudes. In the "Axioms of Intuition" (A1621B202) Kant argued that every 
possible object of human experience must be an extensive magnitude. Now, an ex-
tensive magnitude is that quantum whose measure is determined by units exter-
nally related to one another, and which in sum make up a determinate measure. 
But, according to Kant, an extensive magnitude is a schematized category, and so 
it is a magnitude whose externally related parts are gathered up in accordance with 
a determination of time. Now, it is just this that one encounters in an analogous 
way in the Psalmist's conscious recollection of past Biblical theophanies, as well 
as in the second-order palimpsest of non-Biblical theophanies that often underlies 
the sacred text. For Kant, the distinct units of extensive magnitude are determinate 
sensations received in definite space-time co-ordinates. In the Psalms, on the other 
hand, the units or elements that enter into their composition may differ more radi-
cally, because they are events, images, beliefs or customs that may differ in era, or 
even in religion and culture. The externality of some of the elements that make up 
the texture of many of the Psalms is due to their being different theophanies of the 
same Biblical God, e.g. on Sinai and at Bethel. But in other Psalms, the externality 
is due also to their belonging to different cultures and to different religions, e.g. to 
the cult of Baal or of Iskur. 
In the "Anticipations of Perception" (A166fB207) Kant turned to the considera-
tion of quality as intensive magnitude, i.e., as a definite degree of sensation. In for-
mulating the Anticipations, he thought that he had come as close as one might to a 
critical determination of the qualitative conditions for actual experience; and he 
thought that he had thereby incorporated the moment of immediacy into his ac-
count of human experience. He thought that he had determined, in a general fash-
ion and a priori, the limits of the intensive magnitude of any object of possible ex-
perience when he concluded that all experienced objects would necessarily fall at 
some point or degree along a scale of intensity of sensation from 0 to 1, i.e. from 
the wholly empty to the entirely full. In other words, that every object would have 
some determinate degree of sensation. An intensive magnitude or quality, then, is 
the same series of units that we have already considered insofar as they are already 
linked together externally into an extensive magnitude. In degree, however, they 
are brought together into a single experiential unit; they comprise an object insofar 
as it is a unique, qualitatively determinate appearance. In a word, the phenomenal 
object has real intensive magnitude or quality as well as extensive magnitude or 
quantity. A quality is an implicit manifold of potentially distinct units, of course, 
which can be rendered explicitly distinct by analysis. But beyond that, it is an 
explicit and singular unity of sensory experience. For example , in temperature, the 
77th degree enters into the 78th as one of the latter's constituents; yet, along with 
the 76th, 75th and other degrees, it is fused into the one single determinate quality: 
the intensive magnitude = 78 degrees. 
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If we tum to a Psalm that expresses a nature-theophany, we find a theophanic 
presence or quality (kabod, doxa) which informs the complex texture of the Bibli-
cal account. The believer apprehends in faith an intensive magnitude: the greatness 
of the Lord manifest in nature. But discursive analysis also yields an implicit man-
ifold, formed by recollection and palimpsest, which builds up the full force of the 
religious significance of the text. It is in intensive magnitude that Kant speaks of 
"reality," and he hopes to anticipate the novelty inherent in human experience: it is 
to be found in the empirical character of sensation. In the Psalm, too, the primary 
determinant of the qualitative intensity of the text is the theophanic glory which 
provides the theme of the Psalm, and which radically transforms the palimpsestic 
elements of the manifold. Commenting upon Psalm 114, Kraus remarks20 that 
the poet points to the basic event of the theophany as that which encloses 
all other happenings within itself. 
It is here, however, that we must also part company with Kant. He looked to sen-
sation to provide the element of novelty or immediacy; but sensation provides only 
the initial content, its contribution is material. The theophany, on the other hand, 
is the determining presence, the source of what is supremely actual in the experi-
ence and in the account given of it in the Psalm. That immediacy does not merely 
provide material for the formation of an appearance; it is the original source of 
what is supremely actual in the theophany. Rather than being subsumed by the a 
priori formal functions, as sensation is, the theophany commands both nature and 
the Psalmist. That presence is the source of the radically transformative power of 
the manifestation, and the key to the distinctive temporal and spatial magnitude of 
the theophany. And in that magnitude is to be found the appropriate measure and 
an important aspect of the religious significance of the text. 
We must not forget that we are not dealing directly with the question of God, but 
with the question of the appearance of God: with theophany. We are examining 
the factors of such an appearance and the texture of its expression in the Psalms. 
The distinctive character of the intensive magnitude is the source of the religious 
significance ofthe Biblical text, and the ground of the methodological conversion. 
The scope of the present paper does not permit us to follow out a further hint 
suggested by Kant's schematized category of permanence, i.e., durational mag-
nitude in the order of appearance. The career sketch of a Biblical text was meant to 
remind us that its future does not stop with its canonicity, though its status as ca-
nonical determines that future. But the later interpertations also belong to the tem-
poral magnitude of the theophanic event embedded in the text--even the misin-
terpretations belong (in the sense in which at least some "interesting" mistakes 
contribute to scientific understanding). From the point of view of the Biblical in-
tent, the text deliberately expresses a word not simply for its own time, but for all 
times. The Psalmist's "new song" embeds the theophany in the order of duration 
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that is proper to God's own presence and expressive of his fidelity. The continuing 
presence of the event is normative for interpretation and points to the measure of 
the theophany: it is an event for all times. Commenting upon Psalm 18, an in-
terpreter21 sums up the point: 
Manifestly, the poem abounds in the permanently contemporaneous. 
The durational magnitude of the theophanic event made manifest in and through 
the Biblical text is that mode of duration we call eternal. So that a claim to 
theophany today may be seen as living within the temporal magnitude of one or 
more Biblical theophanies. There is no doubt that the Rabbi's claim needs to be led 
back to them as to its measure. But there is no doubt, too, that further discussion of 
temporal magnitude is both required and not possible in the present article. 
Finally, then, what of the spatial magnitude of a nature-theophany? It is often 
and rightly said that Biblical religion presents us with a certain interiority, even 
with a sense of intimacy with the divine. The inwardness appropriate to the religi-
ous significance of a Biblical nature-theophany, however, is not that of the human 
psyche alone, neither that of the human individual nor of the social collectivity. A 
nature-theophany is a summons that calls the Psalmist out into nature in a distinc-
tive way, in order to find there the fundamental creative presence and purpose of 
God within nature itself, to find there the Lord and Master of all creation. 
It is a misreading of a nature-theophany, then, to place the interiority in the 
human psyche alone; for there is interiority in the cosmos as well. A nature-
theophany recovers a distinctive depth in nature, penetrating beyond nature as 
mere fact into nature as creature. But if acceptable discourse withdraws all depth 
from nature, neither will nature be permitted to have its own interiority. It will fol-
low, then, that all interiority will have to be placed within the human psyche; and 
it is this deprivation of nature that drives commentators to "explain" the religious 
significance of theophanic texts by appealing to psychological privacy or collec-
tive agreement. This, too, is one of the pressures that tend to reduce religion to 
morality and purely human concern. The Psalms simply contradict this reduction, 
as do (among others) the Eastern and Western forms of Catholic Christianity. The 
theophanic depth is a certain interior causality welling up in the things of nature, 
breaking beyond their bonds to disclose their ordination to spiritual reality. Spirit 
is here not individual and collective human subjectivity alone ,-neither the Psal-
mist nor the people alone-but is "God's own realism."22 
A nature-theophany professes to speak reliably of an interior depth shared by 
man and nature, their joint submission by which nature and history together ac-
knowledge their. inner ground. That ground professes to disclose the fundamental 
meaning and the ultimate purpose of God in the world; so that what is met with in 
the theophany is original and originating. Time is there in its creative upsurge, 
with a presence that is unconditional. Place is there, too; not hemmed in by other 
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places and on the same footing with them, not a space already constituted, but a 
constituting space. We meet with a spatiality that is that "broad place" to which 
God leads the Psalmist (Ps. 18: 19-20). Such a broad and lasting place professes to 
be a place of spiritual power; not simply the power of kings and armies, of storms 
and quakes and seas, but the power of power, the very origin and seal of power. 
This is no secret, private place, but that large domain in which man and nature 
meet the purposes of God. 
In terms of a methodologically converted discourse, then, I have traced out a 
sort of a priori that is ingredient in Biblical nature-theophany. To be sure, it is not 
the Kantian a priori that informs all possible human experience of objects as ap-
pearances. Moreover, it is in part an historical a priori. Nevertheless, a 
philosophical palimpsest, written in Kant's hand, has been over-written by the re-
ligious schemata of extensive and intensive magnitude, as I have articulated them 
in this paper. We might ask: What has happened to "God's realism" with all of this 
talk about Kant? It is important to remember, therefore, that the present analysis 
takes as its theme, neither theology revealed nor theology philosophical, but-in 
precise if unpardonable terminology-it attempts a theophanology: it is discourse 
about the manifestation of God. That appearance is neither the work of man nor of 
nature; it is taken by the believer to be the work of God. 
These factors have been at play in the analysis: God (theos), his appearance 
(phaenomenon), to man in nature, told in a religious narrative (the Psalms); and fi-
nally, through the present analysis, articulated in terms of discourse (logos). The 
analysis has meant to distinguish but not to separate these factors: God, nature, 
man, appearance and discourse. It has tried to shed some light upon that obscure 
but broad land and that enduring covenant in which the religious believer is con-
vinced that God, man and nature meet and hold their conversation. 23 
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